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IRS PRESSES FOR TRANSPARENCY
ON TAX ACCRUALS

By
Martin H. Zern *

The art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to
procure the greatest quantity offeathers with the least possible
amount of hissing.
- JEAN-BAPTISTE COLBERT
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced
that corporations and businesses generally will be required to
reflect on their tax returns any tax position that is considered
inconsistent with Financial Accounting Standard Board
(F ASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in
1
Income Taxes, or similar financial reporting standards. To this
end, the IRS has developed a new form (Form 1120 Schedule
UTP) that will have to be filed annually by some corporations?
Clearly, the IRS is seeking more transparency from
corporations and businesses in general regarding their tax
planning ventures, which some may categorize as tax evasion
schemes or even scams. No doubt the government's stance is
attributable to its need for more revenue and the overall tone of
hostility by much of the general public to large corporations in
light of the recent - and perhaps continuing - financial crisis.
Many believe that corporations are unfairly reducing their tax
liability by utilization of aggressive corporate tax shelters that
often have no purpose other than tax reduction.
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The posture of the IRS in pressing corporations for more
transparency seems partly attributable to a recent favorable
court decision involving Textron Inc. that considered whether
*Professor, Lubin School of Business, Pace University
Pleasantville, New York
the IRS is entitled to review corporate tax accrual work papers.
This article will analyze this decision by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals. Despite an important IRS victory in this case, IRS
Commissioner Shulman noted the IRS will continue to exercise
"restraint" in seeking tax accrual work papers, which often
include the corporation's tax reserve amount and assessment of
risk on owing more taxes relative to certain transactions. Not
so moderate, will be a requirement that taxpayers disclose
"uncertain tax positions" with their tax return. All the details
are yet to be promulgated by the IRS regarding the factors that
tax advisors will have to consider in making a determination as
to whether a tax position is uncertain. Of course, there are
different degrees of uncertainty. The disclosure of uncertain
tax positions would have to be made at the "time of filing"
using Schedule UTP.
Commissioner Shulman observed that "[t]oday, we spend
up to 25% of our time during large corporate audits searching
for issues rather than having a straightforward discussion with
the taxpayer about the issues."
According to the
Commissioner, the IRS goal is to complete an audit while
reducing the time looking for information. Initially, business
taxpayers with assets over $100 million that have financial
statements prepared under FASB Interpretation No. 48 or
similar accounting standards, and which reflect uncertain tax
positions, will have to disclose such information when their tax
returns are filed. This will extend to taxpayers with assets over
$10 million under a 5-year phase in. 3 The Commissioner noted
that a "concise" statement of the tax position will suffice.
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The Commissioner stated that business taxpayers will not be
required to disclose their risk assessment - that is, how strong
or weak they regard a tax position -- or how much they
reserved on their books. The IRS is taking a "reasonable
approach" and that " (w ]e could have asked for more - a lot
more - but chose not to." By so stating, it appears that the IRS
is making a veiled threat to business taxpayers that are not
more forthcoming in disclosing potentially uncertain tax
positions. Another major reason for seeking more transparency
is the IRS goal of becoming more efficient. Obviously, the
IRS does not want its auditors spending numerous man-hours
hunting for issues that might result in a tax assessment with the
time and effort expended to no avail.
II. TEXTRON
On August 13, 2009, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
decided United States of America v. Textron Inc. and
Subsidiaries. 4 The case was appealed from the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which had
rendered a decision in favor of Textron, holding that the IRS
was not entitled to Textron's tax accrual work papers. The
case was appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals and
initially heard by a three judge panel, which affirmed the
District Court 2 to 1. While this would have normally been the
end of the case, the government requested a further hearing, en
bane, which was granted. In a 3 to 2 decision, the First Circuit
reversed itself, holding that the IRS was entitled to access to
Textron's tax accrual work papers.
The government's persistence in Textron is consistent with
its efforts in recent years to attack the use by corporations of
aggressive, and possibly illegal, tax shelters. The importance
of this case to both the IRS and taxpayers can be gleaned from
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the effort put in by the government in pursuing an ongoing
controversy regarding disclosure of tax accrual work papers.
Six high-level Government lawyers were involved in the case
while Textron was represented by two major law firms.
Corporate concern about the case is evidenced by the fact that a
law professor, the National Chamber of Commerce Litigation
Center, Inc. and the Association of Corporate Council
submitted amicus curiae briefs on behalf ofTextron. 5
Textron, Inc. is a publicly traded major aerospace and
defense conglomerate with well over 100 subsidiaries. It files
a consolidated income tax return and is audited regularly by the
IRS. As a publicly trade company, its financial statements
must be certified by an independent auditor. 6 The financial
statements must show reserves to account for contingent tax
and must reflect an estimate of potential tax liability
m the event of an IRS audit. The reserves are supported by
work papers upon which the independent auditor relies in order
to certify that the financial statements are correct.
Textron's tax department li sts items in its tax return that if
identified and challenged by the IRS could result in an
additional tax assessment. Spreadsheets list each debatable
item with the dollar amount subject to challenge along with a
percentage estimate of the IRS 's chances of success. The book
reserve is calculated by multiplying the percentage times the
questionable item stated in dollars. Work papers, backed up by
emails and other notes, support the calculations. The Supreme
Court has noted that access to tax accrual work papers would
give the IRS the ability to " pinpoint the soft spots" on a
company's tax return to support additional tax liability.7
The IRS has not automatically requested tax accrual work
papers. But as a result of corporate scandals like Enron, it
began seeking work papers where it believed that the taxpayer
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had engaged in certain " listed transactions" the IRS has
8
concluded might manifest tax evasion.
The Textron case evolved from a 2003 audit of its tax
returns for 1998-200 l which revealed that in 2001 Textron had
engaged in nine listed transactions through one of . 1ts
subsidiaries involving equipment purchases from a foretgn
entity with a lease back, on the same day, to the seller. T?ese
deals are known as sale-in, lease-out (SILO), transactwns,
9
which are listed by the IRS as possibly abusive tax shelters.
,

0

Textron had shown its work papers to its outside auditor,
Ernst & Young, but refused to show them to the IRS
In response, the IRS issued an administrative summons seekmg
relevant documents. 10 If only one transaction is questionable,
IRS policy is to seek work papers for that transaction.
IRS
However' where more than one transaction is involved, Ithe
I
policy is to request all the work papers for the tax
. When
Textron refused to abide by the summons, the IRS mttlated an
12
enforcement action in District Court in Rhode Island. As a
defense Textron asserted attorney-client and tax practitioner
and the qualified privilege for litigation materials
under the work product doctrine. The IRS challenged the
privilege claims.
At trial evidence revealed that Textron's work papers were
prepared by its in-house tax lawyers and that _outside counsel
had been retained to advise Textron on tts tax reserve
requirements. Textron admitted that in some instances its
spreadsheets estimated the probability of IRS success on a
challenge to the transaction at 100%. Textron also
that
although its spreadsheets had been shown to and ?1scussed
with its outside auditor Textron retained them. Testimony on
behalf of Textron asserted that litigation over specific items on
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its spreadsheets was always a possibility. The IRS agreed but
claimed this was unlikely.
13

The trial court denied the IRS petition for enforcement. It
agreed that the IRS had a legitimate reason for seeking the
work papers and that Textron waived the attorney-client
privilege and the tax practitioner privilege for non-lawyers by
showing the work papers to Ernst & Young. Nevertheless, it
concluded that the work papers were protected by the work
product privilege derived from the Supreme Court decision in
Hickman v. Taylor' 4 and since codified in Rule 26 (b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court concluded that the
work papers served to satisfy Textron's outside auditors that its
tax reserve was satisfactory so that it could get a "clean"
opinion. However, the work papers, which showed estimated
hazards of litigation percentages, would not have been
prepared "but for" the fact that Textron anticipated litigation
with the IRS.
Although it had initially affirmed the District Court
decision, after the en bane rehearing, the First Circuit reversed
holding that the work product privilege did not apply. The
its prior
court claimed that in so holding it was
1
decision in Maine v. United States Dep 't ofInterior.
The court observed that the work product privilege derived
from the Supreme Court' s decision in Hickman, where there
was ongoing litigation, and where the focus was on typical
papers lawyers prepare for litigation. Often, such material and
other items that are planned for use at trial are not obtained
from or shared with clients and therefore are unprotected by the
attorney-client privilege. Hickman dealt with whether an
adverse party could inquire into oral or written statements
secured by opposing counsel in preparation for litigation that
had already commenced. Hickman cited a privilege in English

courts protecting documents prepared for, but not necessarily
only for, assisting advisors in actual or anticipated litigation.
Such documents (which might be interviews, memoranda,
correspondence briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,
outlines for cross examination and countless other items) are
termed the work product of the lawyer. Hickman concluded
that the witness interviews were protected by the work product
privilege.
The court stated that the IRS was correct in asserting that
the immediate motivation for Textron to prepare tax accrual
work papers was to establish the tax reserve on its books and
get a clean opinion. Further, that no reserve would
necessary unless there was the possibility of the IRS
a transaction. The court observed, however, that the dtstnct
court did not say the work papers were prepared "for use" in
litigation, but only that they would cover liabilities that might
be determined in litigation. The court concluded that the
failure to make a "for use" finding was clearly erroneous.
The court noted that an IRS expert testified that even if
litigation were remote, the work papers would still have to be
prepared to support Textron's judgment on the reserves.
Furthermore, based on Textron's own experience, it was clear
that those issues noted with a high percentage of IRS success
would never be litigated. Even an academic supporter of
Textron concluded that " it is doubtful that tax accrual work
papers, which typically just identify and quantify vulnerable
return positions, would be useful in the litigation anticipated
. .
,1 6
with respect to those postttons.
The court observed that an experienced litigator would not
consider tax accrual work papers as litigation materials. The
work product privilege has always been on litigation. The
privilege will not be triggered by an assertion that the
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documents in question could relate to a matter that "might
conceivably be litigated." As the Supreme Court stated in
Federal Trade Commission v. Grolier, Inc., "the literal
language of Rule 26(b)(3) protects materials prepared for any
litigation or trial as long as they were prepared by or for a party
to the subsequent litigation." 17 In considering whether the
the key inquiry is the
work product privilege is
8
function the document serves. The court pointed out that the
privilege does not attach simply because the work papers were
"prepared by lawyers or represent legal thinking." Only if they
are used in or in anticipation of trial are they protected. The
court mentioned that lawyers who try cases know the " touch
and feel" of work product papers.
Citing its Maine decision, the court stated that the privilege
does not extend to "documents that are prepared in the ordinary
course of business or that would have been created in
essentially similar form irrespective of the litigation." The
court concluded that Maine supported its decision in the
present case. Also, the court referred to the only other circuit
court case that it believed addressed the issue of privilege for
tax accrual work papers. This was the decision of the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. El Paso Co. 19 This case also denied
work product protection employing a "primary purpose" test.
The Fifth Circuit found that the "sole function" of the work
papers was to support financial statements.
The First Circuit concluded that there was no evidence that
Textron's work papers were prepared for use in litigation or
that they would serve any useful purpose in conducting
litigation. The work papers were prepared because Textron has
a legal obligation as an exchange-listed company to comply
with the securities laws and generally accepted accounting
principles for its certified financial statements.
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The court then addressed Textron' s argument that it would
be "unfair" for the IRS to have access to its spreadsheets. The
court stated that " tax collection is not a game," that there is a
public interest in revenue collection, and that if a
could be found to improper deductions, the IRS was entitled to
see it. The court pointed out that the goal is discovering the
truth.
The court also seemed concerned with the practical problem
the IRS has in discovering the under-reporting of corporate
taxes which it stated was "endemic." Textron's consolidated
was over 4,000 pages. The IRS requested the work
papers only after finding specified abusive
Discovery tools granted to the IRS were deemed to be essential
to the collection of revenues.
The court held that the work product privilege was aimed at
protecting work done for litigation, and not for preparing
financial statements and seeking auditor approval. Further,
"IRS access serves the legitimate and important function of
detecting and disallowing abusive tax shelters."
The two dissenters asserted that the majority abandoned the
First Circuit's "because of' test set forth in its prior decision in
Maine which asks whether "in light of the nature of the
and the factual situation in the particular case, the
document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation." The " because of' test
stemmed from the Second Circuit' s decision in United States v.
Adlman.20 They argued that the majority adopted a new
standard, "prepared for use in possible litigation," a test the
dissenters opined is even narrower (i.e., less likely that
documents would be privileged) than the widely rej ected
"primary motivating purpose" test used in the Fifth Circuit and
specifically rejected by the First Circuit. They further argued
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that the majority ignored a " tome" of circuit court precedents
regarding the work-product doctrine and, consequently, they
contravened much of the principles regarding the work-product
doctrine.

Ad/man, which the dissenters opined was adopted by the First
Circuit in Maine, and that "[t]he majority's opinion is simply
stunning in its failure to even acknowledge this language
its suggestion that it is respecting rather than overruling
1v1ame. ,22
L(

The dissenters would follow neither the majority's "prepared
for use in possible litigation" test, which they argued was a
new narrower test, nor the "primary motivating purpose" test of
the Fifth Circuit. They believed that the "because of" test in
Maine, which they claimed was ignored by the majority, was
the correct test and one more in line with five other circuit
courts of appeals. Furthermore, they claimed that the majority
brushed aside the clear text of Rule 26(b)(3), which refers to
documents prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation. They
also asserted that the majority ignored the findings of the
District Court, which were not clearly erroneous.
The minority also disagreed about the majority's reliance on
Maine. In that case, the state of Maine had sought documents
from the Department of the Interior regarding its decision to
classify salmon as a protected species. The District Court found
some of the documents to be unprotected since the Department
had not shown that litigation was the "primary motivating
factor" underlying their preparation. On the Maine appeal, the
dissenters pointed out that "we .... repudiated this test and
adopted the broader 'because of test adopted by the Second
Circuit." 21 The "because of' test the dissenters argued is
appropriate where there is a dual purpose for preparation of the
documents: both business purpose and anticipation of
litigation. They also asserted that documents should be
protected if they are prepared simply to aid in litigation - as
stated in Rule 26(b)(3)- much less primarily or exclusively to
aid in litigation. Preparing a document "in anticipation of
litigation," the dissenters believed, was sufficient for it to be
protected. They felt that the proper test had been spelled out in

•

The dissenters concluded that while the majority's decision
might please the IRS and tax scholars that view
as a
means of combating fraud, the decision threw the doctnne of
work product doctrine into disarray, an issue on which circuit
courts of appeal are split. They believed that the
"ripe" for hearing by the Supreme Court to clanfy thts
.
.
23
Important 1ssue.
Textron filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme
The
Court seeking review of the First Circuit ruling.
importance of the Textron case, at least . to litigators, . is
evidenced by the fact that at least eleven mterested part1es
submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court
. the appea124
supportmg
.
On May 24, 2010, the Supreme Court declined to hear
Textron' s appeal, thus letting stand the First Circuit's decision
allowing the IRS to demand tax work papers from
.
25
corporatwns.

III. CONCLUSION
Since finding the truth is the primary purpose behind all
discovery tools, privilege claims must be carefully scrutinized.
Concerning tax accrual work papers, the standards promulgated
by the courts to determine whether there is protection from
discovery requests are the "but for" and "primary use" tests.
Textron failed both.
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ln recent years, there has been considerable pressure for
both government and corporations to be more transparent. This
is the goal of the IRS when tax collections are down and the
government faces large budget deficits. In this regard, the IRS
has pressed for disclosure by foreign financial institutions of
bank accounts owned by U.S. taxpayers. To avoid more
serious penalties, including possible criminal charges, at least
18,000 taxpayers have voluntary disclosed foreign bank
accounts. Some foreign banks have reached settlements with
the IRS to disclose the names of taxpayers holding accounts in
their institutions.

With the approval of both the First and Fifth Circuits behind
it, the IRS seemingly could go after tax accrual work papers
regularly if it wanted to do so. The decision appears to have
created considerable confusion about the parameters of IRS
discovery. Also, the decision could have some impact on nontax litigation. Attorneys may be reluctant to put in writing their
candid risk assessment as to the chances of winning or losing
since they may not be confident that what they have written
will be protected from discovery. 26
ln a subsequent speech to the American Bar Association,
Commissioner Shulman stated the IRS is clarifying and
strengthening its policy of restraint. 27 He made three points in
this regard: (l) Disclosing issues on Schedule UTP would not
affect the IRS policy of restraint; (2) Drafts of issue
descriptions and information regarding ranking of issues are
protected; and (3) the IRS will not seek documents that would
otherwise be privileged even though shown to the taxpayer's
auditor.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2009-2010 swine flu pandemic was an historic health
event of global proportion. The first influenza pandemic in
over 40 years affected communities in virtually every country
throughout the world. Although the recent pandemic has
abated, questions regarding how it was handled and the
consequences from the response remain unanswered . This
article first enunciates, background information about the
H lN 1 flu, its global reach and subsequent responses by
government and public health agencies are discussed. Next the
recent controversy over mandatory H 1N 1 flu vaccination
policies for employees, particularly those in health care fields,
The debate in New York State over its
is examined.
Department of Health flu vaccination mandate and potential
legal challenges to mandatory flu vaccination policies follows.
As a conclusion, managerial suggestions to avoid employee
litigation are presented.
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